Federal control of CAOs: cause for optimism?

At a time when the ongoing negotiations on the Federal Civil Service Bill have yet again stalled, newly appointed Minister of Federal Affairs and General Administration, Bhagwate Neupane, has made a “landmark” decision. She has announced the immediate termination of all positions as “acting” Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) in Nepal’s municipalities and rural municipalities. Citing a need to ensure “stability” and “professionalism” at local administrative level, the minister has decided to remove all locally posted “interim CAOs” and replace them with “permanent staff” of appropriate rank, once and for all.

For the first time, rural municipalities and municipalities are without acting Chief Administrative Officers. In the past, it was not possible to remove acting officials in these bodies. (Ministry spokesperson, Parajuli)

Yet, is this indeed a “landmark decision” likely to achieve the stated objectives? Well, the termination of “acting CAO” positions is an unprecedented move. It breaks with a long-time practice of allowing local representatives to have some informal influence on CAO postings. Some locals have been able to block undesired CAOs and to have preferred staffers posted instead, others to nominate local staffers as “acting CAOs” and thus to have de facto influence. “Ministerial appointment”, in contrast, is not new, as the ministry always had formal and exclusive authority to post, transfer, and promote CAOs.

Thus, minister Neupane’s decision is only partially a “landmark” one. However, might it still resolve the long-standing local issues of lack of administrative “stability” and “professionalism”, as the minister set forth in her statement? Well, Neupane argues that, in fact, it will accomplish even more. As cited in several news reports, she expects the termination of “acting CAOs” to enable the ministry to finally ensure transparency and efficiency at the local administrative level. As “permanent CAOs” take over the terminated positions, the minister expects to effectively be able to achieve the following objectives, namely to:

curb external interference in staff transfers;
end local representatives handpicking preferred CAOs;
ensure smoother implementation of the staff transfer system;
discourage staffers from preferring only postings in accessible areas;
expand services to remote areas;
enhance administrative justice; and
improve efficiency and service delivery.

Clarifying the terms: the “permanent” CAO versus the “interim” or “acting” CAO – main differences.

Indeed, the minister’s decision may make it more difficult for elected local representatives to have a say in the matter of who is posted as CAO. Officially, the locals must now accept whomever the ministry appoints without rejection. This is clear. However, on the other issues on the list, such as CAOs “avoiding remote areas”, “administrative justice” with respect to staffers favouring some over others, for instance, and “lack of effective and efficient service delivery”, it is not easy to be an optimist. The mere postings of “permanent CAOs”, who are “career civil servants”, might not be enough to resolve those issues.

The “landmark decision”: ensuring that all CAOs possess the formality required rank.

A long-term solution or a mere drop in “troubled waters”?

This lurking doubt arises from the whole context of “unstable” and “unprofessional” local administration in Nepal. Since the first local election under the federal system in 2017, the staffing of CAO positions has been “troubled waters” indeed, not least due to conflicts between elected local representatives and appointed CAOs. As some CAOs turned out to informally serve a “party” or “faction” or refused to agree to local requests for other reasons, some conflicts have reached boiling point. Many conflicts have also started as CAOs never showed up or were frequently absent, causing frustrating obstacles and delays.

Some local politicians have indeed been seen to block and have appointed CAOs replaced, refusing to accept appointees and using “links and connections” with “higher-ups” also to assign someone “collaborative” in local “corrupt activities”. On those grounds, the minister can indeed easily justify the decision to terminate all “acting CAOs”, as some would be posted and engage in local corruption in “collusion” with elected local politicians. Yet, will the decision truly resolve this and the other issues on the list or merely be a drop in the “troubled waters”? Two of the major issues are suggestive of a risk of the latter.

All employees we have deployed must go to their designated local bodies. No one is allowed to return midway. Local bodies must also ensure they take office. (Ministry spokesperson, Parajuli)

“Absenteeism” and “external influence and handpicking”.

The first issue is the strong tendency of “absenteeism” and the challenge of making even “permanent” CAO’s show up at work. Among those ministerially appointed, many CAOs have a well-known practice of never showing up or being absent for months on end, notably when posted to the “less accessible areas”. Few “career civil servants” wish to go let alone stay in “remote” municipalities and rural municipalities without extended “leaves” back to the city. The minister’s decision says little about how she would tackle this issue of “remote area aversion”, aside from insisting on “discipline”, hence the issue may persist.

To many, the main issue is not a lack of “permanent” CAOs – but some that actually should up every day.

The second major issue is one which the minister’s decision does not resolve at once, namely a practice of “external interference” and “handpicking” of CAOs, not only at the local level, but also at the hands of “higher-ups” at ministerial level. Indeed, “political” or “personal” interference with CAO postings is also carried out “from above” and not seldom under the influence of “political leaders” and “factions” with discrete interest in mind. It is common to place “loyal” subordinates as CAOs either as a “reward”, for example, or as a way to have local staffers “bend the rules” when needed, and indeed often both.

The other issues – and the promise of “local autonomy”

The mere replacement of “acting CAO” positions with, supposedly, “stable” and “professional” “permanent CAOs” may achieve little, if “absenteeism” and “external interference” and “handpicking” of CAOs continue. It will then also be difficult to expect any of the other issues on the list to be resolved. The minister will face great challenges in achieving a “smooth staff transfer system” if “political” or “personal” interference at ministerial level persists; and in trying to “expand services to remote areas”, “enhance administrative justice”, or “improve efficiency and service delivery”. The “landmark” decision will affect the “surface”, namely the “formal system”, yet much less the “informal system” underneath.

It’s not hard to find observations that give less cause for optimism: examples.

In sum, the minister’s termination of all “acting CAO” positions might have some positive effects in some areas. Yet, it would be too optimistic to expect major or sweeping changes. What seems to be achieved, on the other hand, if the appointed “permanent CAOs” indeed all take up their positions, is “centralisation of power”. This aspect may raise eyebrows as the process on the Federal Civil Service Act is nearing completion. Under the new act, the local governments are supposed to have more say in local postings and transfers, not less. The minister’s decision seems to pull in the exact opposite direction.

What about sub/metropolitan and ward level?

It would be amiss not to add that the same “landmark decision” on “acting CAO” positions has neither been applied at metropolitan and sub-metropolitan level, nor at ward level.

Thus, one metropolitan and nine sub-metropolitan cities still lack “permanent CAOs” and continue with “acting CAOs”. The reason is a familiar one, as explained by spokesperson, Parajuli, namely an inability to fill all positions with staffers of “joint secretary” rank, as required by law, as joint secretaries “generally prefer not to be posted outside Kathmandu”. Thus, “under-secretaries” have been deployed as “acting” CAOs instead, notwithstanding the otherwise principled decision applied to CAOs at the municipal and rural municipal level.

At ward level, ward secretaries are still absent in many areas, which is indeed not surprising considering the situation on the CAO front. The exact numbers are hard to come by. Yet, about a year after the first local election under the federal system in 2017, one total count estimated that out of the 6,743 ward offices in the country, around 5,000 did not have a ward secretary. More recent localised reports suggest that many ward committees continue to lack their “head officer” or, in lack of one, have recruited one of their own.

Your take?

What’s your take on minister Neupane’s decision and how will it help or hinder achievements of major official goals in Nepal, such as to “curb local corruption”, as one example, and further a “federal system” of “local government autonomy”, as another? Please feel free to drop us a line in the comment box below and do let us know if we need to add more:-)